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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4345
Economic theory suggests that countries should ignore 
uncertainty for public investment and behave as if 
indifferent to risk because they can pool risks to a much 
greater extent than private investors can.  This paper 
discusses the general economic theory in the case of 
developing countries. The analysis identifies several cases 
where the government’s risk-neutral assumption does 
not hold, thus making rational the use of ex ante risk 
financing instruments, including sovereign insurance.  
This paper—a joint-product of the Hazard Risk Management Unit, Latin America and Caribbean Region, and the Financial 
Markets for Social Safety Net Department, Financial and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to support clients in the management of disaster risks. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at omahul@worldbank.org.   
The paper discusses the optimal level of sovereign 
insurance.  It argues that, because sovereign insurance is 
usually more expensive than post-disaster financing, it 
should mainly cover immediate needs, while long-term 
expenditures should be financed through post-disaster 
financing (including ex post borrowing and tax increases).   
In other words, sovereign insurance should not aim at 
financing the long-term resource gap, but only the short-
term liquidity need. 
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There is growing evidence that the frequency and severity of natural disasters is on the rise (see Figure 1).  
Due to a variety of reasons, ranging from the growing concentration of population and assets in risky 
areas to increases in climate variability, the fiscal and economic exposure of developing countries is 
becoming larger by the year.  Catastrophic events loom large in numerous countries, and in the absence of 
active risk management, bear a serious risk to long-term development efforts.  While most emphasis has 
been on the need for risk mitigation, a growing literature analyzes government capacity to react in the 
aftermath of a major disaster and in particular, government capacity to finance relief and reconstruction 
needs after disasters (see, for example, Freeman, Keen and Mani 2003; Hoffman and Brukoff 2006; 
Rasmussen 2004; Mahul and Gurenko 2006). 
 
Figure 1. Economic Losses and Insured Losses due to Natural Disasters 
 
Source: Munich Re, 2005. 
 
As a result of the increased concentration of the world’s population in vulnerable urban areas, substandard 
construction practices and low insurance penetration, the fiscal and economic risk exposure of developing 
countries to catastrophic events looms large. As illustrated in Figure 2, average damages from large 
disasters faced by developing countries represent 7.1% of GDP over the period 1977-2001, with a peak at 
12.3% of GDP in 1987-1991. Such an exposure to natural disasters affects more specifically small states, 
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Source: IMF 2003. 
 
Indeed, a quick analysis of recent catastrophes shows that funding for relief and reconstruction in 
developing countries generally comes from very different sources than is the case in industrialized 
countries.  In more advanced economies, losses from natural disasters are typically funded through a 
combination of private risk financing arrangements and an efficient public revenue system relying on 
wide and deep taxation catchments.  In middle and low-income countries, which have relatively low tax 
ratios and ongoing fiscal pressures, funding sources for post disaster reconstruction tend to be more 
varied, with strong reliance on ex-post borrowing and assistance from international donors.  Assistance 
from multilateral financial agencies plays a particularly important role in middle-income countries, while 
support from bilateral donors is generally dominant in low-income countries.  The World Bank alone has 
disbursed more than US$40 billion in emergency loans related to natural disasters, as shown in Figure 3.  
Much of this assistance is recent: about 43 percent of all disaster-related loans have yet to close.  
 













Sources: World Bank 2005 
The economic theory suggests that countries should ignore uncertainty for public investment and behave 
as if indifferent to risk because they can pool risks to a much greater extent than private investors.  In 
particular Arrow and Lind (1970) demonstrate that when the risks are publicly borne, the social cost of 
risk-bearing is insignificant and, therefore, the government should ignore uncertainty in evaluating public 
investment because it can distribute the risk associated with any investment among a large number of   4
people.  However, a key assumption underlying this result is that returns from a given public investment 
are independent of other components of national income.  In the context of the financing of natural 
disasters, this theory suggests that governments should act as risk neutral towards natural disasters and 
thus they should not invest in any risk financing strategies that are more expensive than the expected 
losses caused by a natural disaster.  This theory is in fact implemented by a number of large developed 
countries that rely on post disaster financing (including budget reallocation and tax increases) to finance 
catastrophic losses. 
The paper revisits this theory for developing countries.  It identifies several cases where the assumption of 
the government’s policy of risk neutrality does not hold, thus making rational the use of ex ante risk 
financing instruments.  First, the small size of some states, like small state islands, prevents them from 
efficiently pooling natural disasters, as the passage of a hurricane for example is a systemic risk that 
affects the entire economy of the country.  Second, the high level of indebtedness of some countries does 
not allow them to access capital markets in the aftermath of a disaster, thus preventing them from 
transferring some of the risks to the future generations (inter-temporal diversification).  Third, post-
disaster risk financing instruments may not provide quick liquidity after a disaster, creating a liquidity 
crunch.  Under these cases, a cost-effective risk financing (or sovereign insurance in a broad sense) 
strategy for governments would be to secure funds ex ante, through reserve funds, insurance or contingent 
debt (except when the level of debt is already very high). 
The next question addressed in this paper is how much sovereign insurance governments should buy.  The 
concept of dynamic liquidity gap is first introduced.  It is defined as the potential lack of funds for the 
financing of government deficit losses at different periods after the occurrence of a natural disaster (e.g., 
short term, medium term and long term).  It presents a matrix of fiscal vulnerability that should help 
governments analyze potential liquidity gaps and devise optimal insurance strategies.  This concept 
differs from the standard concept of resource gap, usually defined as the long term gap between financial 
needs and post-disaster financing instruments.  The paper shows that, because sovereign insurance is 
usually more expensive than post-disaster financing, it should mainly cover immediate needs, while long 
term expenditures should be financed through post-disaster financing (including ex post borrowing and 
tax increases).  In other words, sovereign insurance should not finance the long term resource gap, but 
only the short term liquidity gap. 
Finally, the paper illustrates this discussion in the light of the newly established Caribbean Catastrophe 
Risk Insurance Facility.  It shows why catastrophe insurance is a cost-effective risk financing solution for 
the small state islands in the Caribbean basin to secure liquidity in the aftermath of a disaster. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 revisits the Arrow-Lind public investment theorem in the 
context of the financing of natural disasters.  Section 3 introduces the concept of dynamic liquidity gap 
and presents a matrix of fiscal vulnerability.  Section 4 illustrates these concepts in the light of the 
Caribbean catastrophe risk insurance initiative.  Section 5 concludes. 
2.  The Arrow-Lind Public Investment Theorem and the Social Cost of Natural 
Disasters 
Arrow-Lind Public Investment Theorem 
In a seminal article about the evaluation of public investments Kenneth Arrow and Robert Lind (1970) 
have shown that, as the net returns to an investment of given size are shared by increasingly many 
individuals, the risk premium for the representative agent vanishes and the aggregate of these premiums 
for all individuals also approaches zero.  This means that the social cost of risk-bearing is insignificant 
and, consequently, the government should ignore uncertainty in evaluating public investments.  Under   5
this result known as the Arrow-Lind Public Investment Theorem, the government should apply the policy 
of risk neutrality in the evaluation of public investment and evaluate projects on the basis of expected net 
benefit alone. 
This theorem has been challenged by several economists.  Fisher (1973) shows that the policy of risk 
neutrality should be modified, where these investments produce certain side effects, such as external costs 
in the form of environmental damages that represent a non-negligible fraction of the real income of the 
affected individuals.  Foldes and Rees (1977) show that the Arrow-Lind theorem does not hold if the 
public investment is correlated with national income.  This is the case for example if the project income is 
not free from taxation and/or some of it is retained to finance public expenditure.  Gardner (1979) stresses 
that the size of the government risk becoming small relative to the economy plays the decisive role in the 
Arrow-Lind Theorem.  Magill (1984) revisits the Arrow-Lind theorem when agents in the economy are 
not affected equally by the introduction of a public project, that is, when some agent may be favorably 
affected while others may be adversely affected. 
The Arrow-Lind theorem is discussed in an economic world a la Lucas (1978) with a risk-averse 
representative agent (with an infinite time horizon).  The national economic growth is depicted by an 
exogenous vector of random variables ( ) ,... , , 2 1 0 c c c  where  t c  is the level of consumption per capita at 
time t.  The probability distribution of the vector of consumption is assumed to be known at t=0.  This 
distribution represents the macroeconomic risk over time.  In the expected utility framework, the inter-
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where u(.) is the representative agent’s Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, increasing and 
concave, and δ  is his discount factor. 
Consider the public investment defined by a vector of cash-flow ( ) ,... , , 2 1 0 X X X , where  t X  is the net 
benefit at time t generated by the investment.  The probability distribution of the cash flows and its 
correlation with the macroeconomic risk are assumed known.   
The costs and benefits of this public investment are equally shared among all taxpayers.  Let ε  be the 
fraction of net cash flows allocated to each taxpayer.  If the project is undertaken, the welfare of 
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This project is socially efficient if the welfare of the representative agent increases, i.e.,  1 V  is higher than 
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This can be rewritten as 
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It is noteworthy that the social discount rate  t r  is independent of the public project but it depends on the 
maturity of the project and the macroeconomic risk.   t B  is the risk-adjusted expected social net benefit, 
i.e., the expected cash-flow adjusted by the macroeconomic risk.  It is also of interest to note that the 
social discount rate  t r  as described above is a standard result in modern finance theory (see, for example, 
Cochrane 2001; Cox, Ross and Ingersoll 1985).  It is easy to show that in the particular case where the 
agent’s preferences are represented by a power function, i.e., his preferences satisfy constant relative risk 
aversion (with the index of constant relative risk aversion equals γ ), and the logarithm of consumption 
follows a Brownian motion with tendency μ  and volatility σ , the social discount rate becomes 
2 2 5 . 0 σ γ γμ δ − + = t r . 
The social discount rate can be decomposed as follows: the pure discount rate δ , a (positive) wealth 
effect and a (negative) precautionary effect.  The wealth effect, γμ  increases with μ , i.e., the 
representative agent expects an increase in future consumption and thus reduces the net present value of 
future earnings.  The precautionary effect, 
2 2 5 . 0 σ γ , increases with the volatility σ , i.e., an increase in 
the uncertainty of future growth reduces the social discount rate. 
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where γ  is the index of representative agent’s index of constant relative risk-aversion. 










X , cov γ  can be interpreted as the social cost of risk bearing.  Should the public 
investment be uncorrelated with the national income, this term vanishes.  This means that the project 
should be evaluated on its expected value.  The government should thus apply the policy of risk neutrality   7
in the evaluation of public investment.  This leads to the Arrow-Lind Public Investment Theorem.  If the 
public project is positively (negatively) correlated with the national income, then the social cost of risk 
bearing is positive (negative) and, consequently, the risk-adjusted expected social net benefit of the 
project is lower than the expected social net benefit. 
The social cost of catastrophic risk bearing 
The question of risk neutrality, and thus the social cost of risk bearing, is reconsidered in the context of 
the financing of catastrophic risks.  How should the government value the economic impact of natural 
disasters? Should the government invest in ex ante risk financing?  The Arrow-Lind Theorem says that 
governments should not invest in ex ante risk financing, like insurance (as long as the insurance premium 
is higher than the expected indemnity payouts) because of the policy of risk neutrality in the evaluation of 
public investment (e.g., purchasing insurance). 
These questions are examined with a simple but robust model of risk-sharing under uncertainty.  The 
proposed model makes explicit the correlation among individual risks (leading to the macro-economic 
risk) and assumes that the government’s risk aversion is mainly caused by its aversion towards short term 
liquidity crunch. 
Consider an economy consisting of identical N agents/taxpayers, i.e., they have the same preferences, 
where each agent faces a random loss  i x ~  due to the occurrence of a natural disaster.  The series of 
individual random individual losses is denoted ( ) N x x x ~ ,..., ~ , ~
2 1  and, for the sake of simplicity, is generated 
from a probability distribution with mean  0 > μ  and variance  0
2 > σ .  It is important to notice that the 
individual random losses  i x ~  are not assumed to be statistically independent.  In particular, this means that 
each individual risk can be correlated with the other individual risks, which can be viewed as the macro-
economic risk. 










 tends to the population mean μ  as 
the size of the sample increases: 
[] 1
~
Pr lim = < −
∞ → ε μ X
N
, for  0 > ε , 
The central limit theorem can be used to specify the amount of reserves the government needs to set aside 
to finance emergency needs in the aftermath of a disaster (e.g., relief operations, early recovery 
operations).  We assume that the government holds reserves to achieve a specified probability of liquidity 
crisis  α .  The amount of risk capital per taxpayer to cover any deviations from the expected loss 
(population mean) is thus calibrated to satisfy the liquidity constraint: 
[] α μ − = ≤ − 1
~
Pr N k X ,   8
Assuming that the correlation between any pair of individual losses is ρ  and, for the sake of simplicity, 
the individual losses are identically normally distributed,
2 one can easily show that the amount of risk 
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where  α z  is the value from the standard normal distribution such that  [] α α − = < 1 ~ Pr z z .  It is 
interesting to note that  N k  increases as the variability of individual losses and/or the correlation among 
losses increases.  It is noteworthy that, as the size of the population N becomes large, the amount of 
reserves per taxpayer satisfies  σρ α z kN N =
∞ → lim .   
The social cost of catastrophic risk bearing is defined as the cost of holding these reserves (per taxpayer), 
beyond the annual expected loss μ .  Denoting s the (marginal) opportunity cost of holding catastrophic 
reserves, the social cost of catastrophic risk bearing is 
σρ α sz sk = . 
The above equation allows for a discussion on the key drivers of the social cost of catastrophic risk 
bearing.  First, it is equal to zero if individual losses are not correlated,  0 = ρ , that is, there is no 
macroeconomic risk.  This leads to the Arrow-Lind theorem.  On the contrary, the higher the correlation 
among individual losses, the higher the social cost of catastrophic risk bearing.  This illustrates that small 
states exposed to natural disasters that can affect the entire country, like small Caribbean islands exposed 
to hurricanes, face a high social cost of catastrophic risk-bearing.  For example, hurricane Ivan in 2004 hit 
the island of Grenada and caused losses equal to 200% of GDP.  On the contrary, if natural disasters 
affect a small fraction of the economy and thus the size of the event is small relative to the economy, as it 
is the case for large economies, the correlation coefficient ρ  is negligible and thus the social cost of 
catastrophic risk bearing becomes negligible, leading large countries to apply the policy of risk neutrality 
in the financing of natural disasters. 
A second key variable in the social cost of catastrophic risk bearing is the (marginal) opportunity cost of 
reserves.  Should a country be able to reallocate his budget immediately after a disaster to finance its 
liquidity needs, then the opportunity cost of holding catastrophic reserves is negligible and thus the social 
cost of catastrophic risk bearing is negligible.  Again, most developing countries, and particularly small 
countries, do not have this flexibility in their budget, making the opportunity cost of reserve high, and 
thus the social cost of catastrophic risk bearing is high. 
Finally, governments may want to reduce the social cost of catastrophic risk bearing by increasing the 
probability of liquidity crisis α .  Governments would be ill-advised to do so because this may generate 
huge economic and human losses in case the government is not able to face basic emergency needs in the 
aftermath of a disaster. 
As discussed later in this paper, very few financial instruments allow for quick disbursements in the 
aftermath of a disaster.  Insurance is one of them.  The demand for catastrophic risk insurance is thus 
                                                 
2 It can be shown that the results still hold if individual losses are not normally distributed, but they can be 
decomposed into a systemic risk and an idiosyncratic component, where idiosyncratic risks are independent and 
identically distributed.   9
driven by the social cost of catastrophic risk bearing.  It is cost-effective for the government to purchase 
insurance if and only if the cost of insurance, defined as the commercial premium net of the expected 
payout μ , is lower than the social cost of catastrophic risk bearing  σρ α sz sk = .
3 
3. Liquidity Gap vs Resource Gap 
 
In order to help countries reduce their reliance on external assistance, the World Bank has been promoting 
a country risk management framework which is partly based on corporate risk management principles but 
also factors in key economic and social metrics such as government fiscal profiles, the living conditions 
of the poor, and investment in risk mitigation (Gurenko and Lester 2004).  This risk management 
approach relies on the identification of potential resource gaps between potential losses and the capacity 
of a country to finance relief and reconstruction needs in time of a crisis.  This approach is based on a 
static framework for the financing of catastrophe risks – it focuses on the total losses caused by a potential 
event and determines how to fund these losses. 
 
Unfortunately, this approach fails short of providing a practical framework for action and may lead to 
sub-optimal use of risk financing instruments.  While losses resulting from a major disaster can occur in a 
very short time, the resulting financing needs can spread over a much larger period.  Although losses are 
immediate, relief and reconstruction operation can spread over several years.  An analysis of the resource 
needed after a disaster that integrates this time variable should allow for the development of more 
efficient risk financing strategy for countries exposed to natural disasters. 
 
This section presents a catastrophe risk financing framework for countries (and sub-national entities like 
municipalities) exposed to adverse natural events that integrates the dynamic aspect of risk financing 
needs and resources.  It defines the concept of dynamic liquidity gap as the potential lack of funds for 
financing public expenditures at different periods after the occurrence of a natural disaster (e.g., short 
term, medium term, long term).  It examines how liquidity gaps can be financed using a combination of 
ex-ante risk financing instrument (including reserves, budget reallocations, contingent debts, insurance) 
and ex post vehicles (including borrowing, donor assistance, tax increases, etc.).  It presents a matrix of 
fiscal vulnerability that should help governments analyze potential liquidity gaps and devise optimal risk 
financing strategies. 
 
The budgetary impact of natural disasters 
 
In addition to the enormous human toll, natural disasters generally create enormous strain to the budget of 
an affected country.  The budgetary implications can be derived from the financing needs faced by a 
government during the three main phases of recovery operation post disaster. 
 
Relief operations include emergency assistance provided to the affected population to ensure basic needs, 
such as the need for shelters, food and medical attention.  Such costs can be difficult to estimate ex-ante, 
as they depend on the specific characteristics of the catastrophic event (location, intensity, period of the 
year (winter or summer), period of the day (day or night), etc.), but are relatively small compared to the 
subsequent recovery and reconstruction operations.  These expenditures can be estimated based on 
scenario analysis as recently done by the Directorate for Prevention and Emergency Response in Bogotá 
DC, Colombia (Ghesquiere, Jamin and Mahul, 2006).  While relief costs are limited, they need to be 
financed in a matter of hours after a disaster event.  The capacity of governments to mobilize resources 
for relief operation at short notice should be a key component of its risk financing strategy. 
 
                                                 
3 Mahul and Gurenko (2006) provide a formal analysis of the design of an optimal ex ante risk financing strategy.   10
Early recovery operations following the initial relief efforts are crucial to limit secondary losses and 
ensure that reconstruction can start at earliest.  They include, among other things, the emergency 
restoration of lifeline infrastructure (e.g., water, electricity and key transportation lines), the removal of 
debris and the financing of basic safety nets.  It is also during this phase that engineering firms can be 
mobilized to start the design of infrastructure works that will have to take place during the reconstruction 
phase.  Several techniques exist to estimate the likely cost of recovery operations.  Catastrophic risk 
models can simulate the impact of natural disasters, such as earthquake, on the infrastructure and thus 
provide rough estimates of the lifeline infrastructure that is likely to be damaged in case of a major 
disasters.  Such models can also be used to assess the number of people that are likely to result homeless 
and the number of building that will have to be rebuilt. 
 
Reconstruction operations generally center on the rehabilitation or replacement of assets damaged by a 
disaster.  These include public building and infrastructure which are the direct responsibility of the state.  
At the same time, it is important to note that national or municipal authorities generally have to face 
obligations that go beyond their own assets.  In most cases, government will have to subsidize the 
reconstruction of private assets and in particular housing for low-income families who could not 
otherwise afford to rebuild their homes.  Here again, catastrophe risk modeling techniques can be used to 
estimate the potential damage to the infrastructure and public and private dwellings.  They can provide, 
for each group of assets, risk metrics such as the probable maximum loss for given return period, which 
can help the authorities assess the budgetary needs caused by potential catastrophic events.  The use of 
scenario analysis coupled with risk models can also help authorities better understand their potential 
needs over time. 
 
Table 1 provides an illustration of the difference in timing of financing needs resulting from relief, 
recovery and reconstruction operations. 
 
Table 1. Estimated Timing of Budgetary Outflow caused by a Catastrophic Event 
 Short  term 
(1-3 months) 
Medium term 
(3 to 9 months) 
Long term 
(over 9 months) 
Relief Operations                
    Emergency assistance                 
Recovery Operations                
    Removal of debris                   
    Temporary safety net                    
    Rehabilitation of lifeline utilities                     
Reconstruction                
    Rehabilitation of strategic infra.                      
    Housing                         
    Utilities                         
    Education                         
    Administrative buildings                         
    Transport                         
 
In all three phases, the capacity to provide relief, carry out recovery works and complete reconstruction 
operations will also depend on the absorption capacity of the affected economy.  In the cases of major 
disaster, all the damaged assets cannot be rebuilt at once and the government will have to establish a 
pecking order allowing for key assets to be rebuilt/rehabilitated first (e.g., hospitals), while other can be 
restored at a later stage (e.g., schools, administrative buildings).  These choices made by the authorities 
will influence the timing of financing required for reconstruction operations. 
   11
Finally, when analyzing budget requirement, it is important to consider local budget appropriation and 
execution regulations.  While some countries have developed emergency legislations that allow for the 
emergency procurement before a financing source has been identified, most countries have maintained 
more conservative legislations.  In some countries for example, tender for emergency work cannot start 
until full budget appropriation has been approved by parliament.  An optimal risk financing strategy will 
have to ensure that funds are available at the appropriate time in a post disaster situation, but should also 
aim at amending outdated legislation that may prove a burden in the aftermath of a major event. 
 
Financing post disaster operations  
 
In the larger industrial countries, losses from natural disasters are typically funded through a combination 
of private risk financing arrangements and an efficient public revenue system relying on wide and deep 
taxation catchments.  In the case of developing countries, which have relatively low tax ratios and 
ongoing fiscal pressures, funding sources for post disaster reconstruction tend to be more varied, with a 
strong emphasis on assistance from international donors.  Multilaterally sourced infrastructure loans and 
relief aid from donors are among the most common sources of such disaster funding. 
 
A variety of instrument can be considered in the establishment of a risk financing strategy.  These can be 
classified as ex-ante risk financing instruments such as the building of financial reserves, contingent debt 
agreements, insurance (and alternative risk transfer solutions), and post-disaster risk financing 
instruments including tax increases, reallocating funds from other budget items, access to domestic and 
international credit, borrowing from multilateral finance institutions, etc.  Many developing countries also 
rely on the assistance from international aid.  While donors have been generous in a number of cases, 
assistance has been highly dependent on the visibility of a given event in the international press, making it 
a fairly unreliable instrument for risk management. 
 
Table 2 provides a classification of risk financing instruments based on the availability of funds in the 
short-term, medium-term and long-term period following a catastrophe.  The timing on the availability of 
fund is based on the experience of recent operations (e.g., Turkey, Mexico, Mongolia, and Colombia) and 
can vary depending on the economic and financial characteristics of a country.  In particular, the 
borrowing capacity of the country will depend on its level of indebtedness and its access to insurance is 
usually limited by the size of its domestic insurance market.  The capacity of a country to finance post 
disaster operations at any given time will very much dependent upon the source of financing available.  A 
government that would rely solely on ex-post credit and tax increase would face serious challenges in the 
financing of its relief and emergency recovery operations.  Conversely, a government relying solely on 
reserves and insurance may be very well positioned to finance post disaster operations but this strategy 
may be more costly than is strictly necessary.   12
Table 2. Availability of Financial Instruments Over Time 
 
  Short term 
(1-3 months) 
Medium term 
(3 to 9 months) 
Long term 
(over 9 months) 
E x - p o s t   f i n a n c i n g            
   Budget contingencies                
   Donor assistance (relief)                
   Budget reallocation                 
   Domestic credit               
   External credit              
   Donor assistance (reconstr.)             
   Tax increase            
E x - a n t e   f i n a n c i n g            
   Reserve fund                   
   Contingent debt                   
   Parametric insurance                   
   Traditional insurance                   
 
 
The government pays for reconstruction using different domestic sources, such as reorienting the national 
budget, raising taxes, new domestic credit, and the accumulation of financial reserves (Caballero 2003).  
However, pursuing a post-disaster financing strategy has high opportunity costs.  Budget allocations are 
diverted from priority development projects in order to face emergency and recovery needs.  Raising new 
domestic debt in an expensive post-event capital market may significantly affect the country’s debt 
service, and raising taxes may discourage new private investments that are central to restart the economy.  
The government may not wish to retain all possible losses given the cost of risk transfer, but rather those 
which are below a tolerable fiscal cost threshold.  This threshold should be determined with a view to 
avoiding disruption in the projected fiscal and macroeconomic performance and should also take into 
account post funding sources provided by international donors. 
 
An important consideration when building up the response capacity of the state is the benefit of 
stabilizing budget appropriations for the state.  Too often, important development programs are 
interrupted because of small disaster event that require immediate attention.  The use of budget 
contingencies and reserves should allow for limited disruption in the budget of long term development 
programs.  The use of contingent budget lines and the building of small is usually appropriate to cover 
events with return period of 1 to 7 years.  The use of contingent credit lines may be appropriate for events 
with longer return period. 
 
The transfer of catastrophic risk constitutes a key financial strategy in the economic management of 
disaster prone countries. The access to a new generation of sovereign insurance (or macro-insurance) 
instruments to guard against the impact of natural disasters may enhance the risk financing strategy of 
developing countries (Caballero 2003). These macro insurance instruments should be contingent on 
observable variables that are independent of the country’s actions, voiding moral hazard problems, such 
as weather indices (e.g., rainfall, temperature, earthquake magnitude, wind speed). 
 
Catastrophe (cat) bonds are an example of insurance-linked securities (ILSs) that transfer catastrophic risk 
to the capital markets via the issue of a bond where repayment of principal is contingent upon occurrence 
of a predefined catastrophe. The specified value limit of the cat bond is paid out when a pre-determined 
indemnity level, index or parametric trigger occurs (see Box 1). The parametric trigger based on 
scientifically measurable characteristics of a hazard (e.g., wind speed, earthquake intensity) is the most   13
frequent because it protects investors from moral hazard and provides for quick payments. Introduced in 
the mid 1990’s, these ILSs mainly cover losses caused by wind and earthquake. Although it is still an 
experimental market, the annual stream of cat bond issues has been around US$2 billion over the last 
three years, with a peak at US$3.3 billion in 2006.  
 
Box 1.  Catastrophe Bonds 
 
Capital raised by issuing the bond is invested in safe securities such a Treasury bonds, which are held by a special-
purpose vehicle (SPV).  This arrangement keeps the transaction off the balance sheet of the issuer and insulates 
investors from the counter-party credit risk.  The bond issuer holds a call option on the principal in the SPV with 
triggers spelled out in a bond contract.  Those can be expressed in terms of issuer’s losses from a pre-defined 
catastrophic event, by hazard characteristics, and/or its location.  If the defined catastrophic event occurs, the bond-
issuer can withdraw funds from the SVP to pay claims, and part or all of interest and principal payments are 
forgiven.  If the defined catastrophic event does not occur, the investors receive their principal plus interest equal to 
the risk-free rate (e.g., London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR)), plus a risk spread usually between 300 to 500 
basis point over LIBOR. 
The average size of issue is around US$100 million, varying from US$10 million to almost US$600 million. The 
typical maturity of cat bonds is between one year and ten years, with an average maturity of 3 years. Issuers include 
insurance and reinsurance companies and, in some cases, insureds. These securities offer countries an alternative to 
sovereign insurance. 
The cat bond market has developed slowly but steadily since it was launched in the 1990s as insurers have used the 
capital-market instruments as an alternative to using their own balance sheets to cover the potentially huge costs of a 
natural disaster, which could provoke massive insurance claims in a single area.  A total of almost $13 billion of cat 
bonds has been issued since the 1998s.  About $8 billion of cat bonds are outstanding, covering against natural 
disasters in the U.S., Western Europe, Japan, Taiwan and Australia and, more recently, Mexico. 
 
 
Source: Lane Financial, 2006. 
 
Contingent capital is an alternative risk transfer (ART) product through which capital funding is provided 
to the client after the occurrence of some specific risk-related loss, often on pre-loss financing terms. It is 
designed to provide immediate and less expensive capital to the client when it is most needed (e.g., after 
an economic loss) and/or most scarce (e.g., after a regional disaster). Contingent capital facilities can be 
viewed as put options on paid-in capital. More specifically, this is essentially a commitment by a capital 
provider to provide paid-in capital on pre-agreed terms if the buyer of the facility exercises that right on 
or before the expiration of the contingent facility. Just like a regular option, contingent capital can be 
characterized by the risk of underlying asset, exercise style, and strike price. While this facility can 
potentially provide a country with a lower cost  capital relative to either a pure risk transfer solution (e.g., 
sovereign insurance) or accumulation of reserves, the major disadvantage is that once disbursed this   14
facility could exacerbate the debt burden of the country. The effectiveness of this facility would thus 
depend on the country’s post-disaster financial profile, and more specifically on its post-disaster ability to 
service debt. 
 
Box 2.  Innovative Catastrophe Risk Financing Strategies in Latin America 
 
Due to its location, Colombia is highly prone to natural disasters.  The country strides the Andean mountain region 
and the Pacific “belt of fire,” where high seismic potential combines with volcanic activity.  In the last 25 years, the 
country has suffered six major earthquakes, three volcanic eruptions, major landslides, avalanches, petroleum and 
chemical explosions/leaks, and extensive flooding.  The Government of Colombia and the World Bank designed a 
project that aims to reduce the fiscal vulnerability of the state to adverse natural events by strengthening national 
capacity to manage disaster risk, financed by a USD260 million World Bank loan.  This loan includes a USD 150 
million contingent credit line that would provide the Government with immediate liquidity in the event of a major 
disaster occurring in Colombia. 
 
Mexico is another country highly exposed to natural hazards, including hurricanes and earthquakes.  In March 2006, 
Mexico issued $160 million of (binary) catastrophe bonds to cover against the risk of earthquakes.  The Mexican 
earthquake bond, which has been sold to institutional investors in the U.S. and Europe, acts like an insurance policy 
for the Mexican government.  Investors are paying $160 million into a fund created by Swiss Re AG for the 
Mexican government; if an earthquake of a certain force hits in designated areas of the country within the next three 
years, the government will be able to draw from these funds.  If no disaster occurs during the life of the fund, the 
money will be returned to the investors.  This is the first time a sovereign country has issued a catastrophe bond. 
 
Dynamic Liquidity Gaps 
 
An efficient risk financing strategy should be designed based on the marginal cost of capital available in 
each phase of the post disaster operations.  Ex-post disaster sources of funds will generally be cheaper 
than ex-ante instrument.  Unfortunately, and as shown in Table 2, resources available through ex-post 
instruments are generally limited in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.  Other factor such as the fiscal 
situation of a given country may also limit its capacity to rely on ex post borrowing or tax increases. 
 
A first step in building an efficient risk financing strategy will consist in comparing estimated resource 
needs with estimated resource available in each phase of the post disaster operation.  Figures on both 
sides of this equation will depend on the characteristics, and in particular the magnitude, of a potential 
disaster.  Catastrophic risk modeling techniques and scenario analysis can provide estimates of potential 
needs that can be used to guide the policy maker (see Annex 1).  Table 3 shows such exercise for a small 
to medium size state exposed to a variety of hazards.  For illustrative purpose, the matrix of resource 
availability is built for a 1-in-100 year event to assess the potential deficit in the various phases of the post 
disaster operations.  A more complete exercise would include similar analysis for various return periods 
ranging from 20 to 500 years or more.  In doing so, one should bear in mind that some instrument such as 
budget reallocation or donor assistance will be easier to mobilize with disaster of greater magnitude.  
Conversely, the capacity of a government to call on domestic credit or increase taxes may be adversely 
affected by a major disaster.   15
Table 3.  Resources Availability Post Disaster in Case of a One in a Hundred Year Event 
(illustrative example) 
 
US$ millions  Short term 
(1-3 months) 
Medium term 
(3 to 9 months) 
Long term 
(over 9 months) 
Ex-post financing     
   Budget contingencies (limited)  10     
   Donor assistance (relief/limited)  6     
   Budget reallocation    25   
   Domestic credit    10  10 
   Donor assistance (reconstruction)    10  75 
   External credit      150 
   Tax increase       50 
Ex-ante financing     
   Reserve fund  4     
   Contingent debt  0     
   Index based insurance  0     
   Catastrophe bonds  0     
   Indemnity Insurance  4  26   
Estimated total available  24  71  285 
Estimated needs  30  71  500 
Resource surplus (gap)  (6)  -  (215) 
 
 
Table 4 illustrates a more complete exercise where the analysis is done for various return periods.  Such 
analysis can help policy makers assess where the estimated budgetary outlays would exceed the financial 
resources available at a given point in time after the occurrence of a disaster. 
 
Table 4.  Matrix of country fiscal vulnerability (illustrative example) 
Estimated post disaster needs  
(US$ million) 
 Dynamic  funding  gap 
(US$ million) 
Return period 








 Return  period 








Short term  5  30  50 Short term  -  (6)  (26)
Medium term  20  71  110 Medium term  -  -  (39)
Long term  300  500  1,200 Long term  (15)  (215)  (915)
 
In the example above, the country does not face any short term resource gap (or liquidity gap) in the case 
of a 1-in-20 year catastrophe event.  If a 1-in-100 year catastrophe event occurs, the short term resource 
gap is estimated at US$6 million and the long term resource gap is estimated at US$215 million.  A 1-in 
500 year event would cause a US$15 million short-term resource gap, a US$215 million medium-term 
resource gap and a US$915 million long-term resource gap. 
 
The understanding of potential liquidity gap based on the timing at which resources will be needed can 
greatly influence the design/improvement of a catastrophe risk financing strategy aimed at reducing the 
funding gap at given period of potential post disaster operations.  One approach is to start with more   16
frequent events and build up the response capacity of the state to an acceptable return period (e.g., 200 
year event).  The decision on this return period is arbitrary and depends on the scenario at play and 
financial capacity of the government considered. 
 
A hypothetical risk financing strategy is illustrated in Table 5.  It provides coverage up to the worst case 
scenario described in Table 4 (500 years return period).  Parametric insurance, are used to cover short-
term budget outlays (mainly relief and early recovery), assuming that the building of financial reserve is 
not politically feasible beyond a limit of US$6 million.  In the medium term, the country finances the 
expenditures through budget reallocation and domestic credit.  Particular efforts can be put on broadening 
the state insurance program.  Long-term expenditures (including mainly reconstruction costs) are financed 
with donor aid, external credit and tax increase. 
 





(US$ million)  Risk financing strategy 
Short term  26  Building of reserve for US$6 million 
 
 
Purchase of parametric insurance for 20 million 
coverage 
Medium term  39  Broadening and optimization of the state insurance 
program 
Long term  915  Conservative fiscal policies to expand potential access 
to external capital 
 
 
The use of dynamic financial analysis also illustrates the need to differentiate between the concept of 
liquidity gap, which the difference between resources needed and available at specific time in the 
aftermath of a potential disaster event; and the overall resource gap faced by a country, which is the 
difference between the resources available post disaster overall compared to the needs that would be 
generated by a potential disaster event. 
 
Financial strategies can easily be devised to limit the risk of liquidity gap post disaster.  These strategies 
can be highly effective in ensuring that resources are available to finance post disaster operation when 
needed.  A good understanding of the timing in the needs for resources can help optimize such strategy. 
 
A resource gap tends to indicate a deficit in the resources needed to address disaster losses in the long-
run.  This is often the case for countries with high debt to GDP ratio, which would not be able to access 
external credit to the full extent their needs in case of disaster.  These countries have literally lost the 
possibility of spreading risk over time.  Recent analysis conducted by the IADB (2005) show that a 
number of countries in Latin America face resource gap for return period a frequent as 100 years. 
 
For these countries, there is an urgent need to engage both in risk reduction activities to reduce their 
overall exposure and in conservative fiscal policies that would over time increase their capacity to 
mobilize resources should a disaster event occur.   17
 
Box 3.  Hurricane Ivan in Grenada 
Grenada provides a good example of the difficulties faced by a small island states hit by a major disaster.  Hurricane 
Ivan struck Grenada on September 7, 2004.  Classified as a Category 3 hurricane with sustained winds of 120 mph 
and gusts of up to 135 mph, Ivan left tremendous devastation in its wake.  A damage assessment jointly conducted 
by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the United Nations Economic Commission of Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) estimated damage over US$800 million or twice Grenada’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). 
Following the passage of Hurricane Ivan, Grenada experienced a dramatic decline in revenues combined with 
immediate needs for liquidity to finance relief, cleanup and emergency rehabilitations.  Between September and 
December 2004, the revenue shortfall was approximately 5 percent of GDP.  The Government which had only 
limited reserves quickly faced serious problem financing the public service bill.  It also became evident that the 
country would not be able to meet its debt obligations as they fell due. 
To face this situation, the country engaged in a three prone approach to try to find the necessary liquidity: 
Donor Assistance – Following the damage assessment, the Government convened a donor conference pledged in 
excess of US$150 million to assist in the reconstruction of the island.  These pledges included a US$10 million from 
DfID to support payment of salaries in the education sector and US$ 2 million from the World Bank for the 
financing of critical imports.  While these contributions were particularly generous, it is interesting to note that these 
were the only two donors able to provide immediate liquidity to the government despite the urgent needs expressed 
at the conference.  The remainder of the funds was earmarked for reconstruction project that were implemented over 
the following two years. 
Debt restructuring – October 4, 2004, less than one month after Hurricane Ivan, the Ministry of Finance issued a 
press release on announcing Grenada’s intention to seek the cooperation of creditors in light of the economic crisis 
precipitated by the hurricane.  .  With financial and legal assistance financed by USAID and DfID, the government 
developed an exchange offer to its creditors to restructure over 85 percent of the Government commercial debt 
(approx. US$265 million) had agreed to an exchange offer.    
Tax increase – The government also passed revenue-enhancing measures yielding over 2 percent of GDP.  These 
included: (i) an increase of about 45 percent in the retail price of fuel; (ii) an increase in excise taxes on alcohol and 
tobacco; (iii) a special levy on incomes over US$375 per month for a five year period; and (iv) improved tax 
administration. 
Despite all these efforts, Grenada’s fiscal situation remained challenging and the country still faced a financing gap 
of 4.5 percent of GDP for 2005 with total debt projected to increase to 150 percent of GDP. 
 
4. Sovereign Insurance for the Caribbean Islands 
 
Caribbean countries are highly exposed to adverse natural events, which can result in disasters affecting 
their entire economic, human, and physical environment.  On average, at least one major hurricane and 
numerous tropical storms cross the Caribbean each year.  Other types of catastrophic events including 
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and tidal waves are less frequent can be as devastating, as demonstrated 
by the near total destruction of the island of Montserrat by a volcanic eruption in 1995.  For many 
reasons, ranging from the growing concentration of assets to poor environmental management, the loss 
burden from natural disasters is increasing.  Because of their small size, Caribbean countries have limited 
financial capacity to respond to adverse natural events.  Larger countries can generally absorb the impact 
of these events by subsidizing the affected region with revenues from unaffected regions.  This type of 
geographic diversification of risk is limited in the small island states of the Caribbean.  The inability to 
respond effectively, physically and financially, often slows recovery, which exacerbates the poverty 
impact of natural disasters.   
 
While Caribbean countries have limited capacity to spread risk geographically, their constrained 
borrowing capacity also prevents them from spreading their risk over time by accessing credit.  An 
analysis of economic statistics from Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) indicates 
an average ratio of external debt to GNI of 86 percent, compared to 34 percent for low-income countries, 
and 20 percent for middle-income countries.  Caribbean countries affected by natural disasters generally   18
see their access to credit dramatically reduced right at the time when they need it most, limiting their 
capacity to respond to emergency needs.  The limited lines of credit that are available, including IMF 
contingent facilities, often take time to materialize and add to the debt burden as they must usually be 
repaid in a very short time frame.   
 
In these circumstances, Caribbean governments affected by natural disasters have generally relied on 
extensive financing from international donors to finance post-disaster needs.  While ex post disaster 
funding from bilateral and multilateral agencies can be an important component of a government’s 
catastrophe risk management strategy, over-reliance on this approach has obvious limitations.  Donor 
assistance can take a long time to materialize and usually is earmarked for specific investments, with 
limited possibilities to finance general budget outlays such as civil servants’ salaries, debt services, and 
other government obligations. 
 
Finally, Caribbean governments’ access to traditional catastrophe insurance and reinsurance markets is 
limited because of the high transaction costs resulting from the relatively small business brought to the 
reinsurance market.  In the absence of well-functioning catastrophe insurance markets, most of the 
economic loss is borne by governments and households, with a disproportional impact on the poor. 
 
The concepts of liquidity gap and social cost of catastrophic risk bearing are illustrated in the case of the 
Caribbean catastrophe risk insurance initiative.  The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility 
(CCRIF) aims to provide participating countries with an insurance instrument that would help shelter 
them from natural disasters.  The Facility, launched on June 1 2007, enables governments to purchase 
catastrophe insurance coverage against hurricanes and earthquakes, such as a major earthquake or the 
passing of a hurricane (see Box 4).   
 
As of June 1, 2007, fifteen Caribbean countries have purchased catastrophic insurance for a total premium 
volume of US$17 million and a total sum insured of US$444 million.  This high level of enrollment 
allows the CCRIF to efficiently diversify its portfolio and thus access reinsurance on better terms.   
Reinsurance capacity of US$110 million has been purchased on the reinsurance market which, with the 
initial US$10 million retention, ensures that the Facility would sustain a 1-in-1000 year event. 
 
Box 4.  The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility 
•  The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) allows CARICOM governments to 
purchase insurance coverage to finance immediate post-disaster recovery needs. 
•  The Facility acts as a risk aggregator.  The CCRIF allows participating countries to pool their country-
specific risks into one, better-diversified portfolio.  This diversification should result in a substantial 
reduction in premium cost of up to 40 percent. 
•  Claims payments depend on parametric triggers.  Index-based (or parametric) insurance instruments pay 
claims based on the occurrence of a pre-defined event rather than an assessment of actual losses on the 
ground.  This measurement, made remotely by an independent agency, allows for transparent, low 
settlement costs and quick-disbursing contracts. 
•  Insured countries pay an annual premium commensurate with their own specific risk exposure.  
Parametric insurance products will be priced for each country based on the individual country risk profile.  
Annual premiums will typically vary from US$200,000 to US$4 million for coverage ranging from US$10 
million to US$50 million.  As of June 1, 2007, fifteen Caribbean countries are members of the Facility.  
The total premium volume is US$17 million for a total sum insured of more than US$400 million. 
•  The Facility is created with financial support from donors.  Donors have pledged almost US$50 million 
to support the establishment of the Facility.  These funds will be used to pay for operational expenditures, 
reinsurance costs, etc.  This will thus allows the Facility to build up reserves from countries’ insurance 
premiums and participation fees more quickly.     19
•  The Facility transfers the risks it cannot retain to the international financial markets.  CCRIF was able 
to secure US$110 million of claims paying capacity on the international reinsurance and capital markets. 
The reinsurance structure consists of four layers: CCRIF retains the first layer of US$10 million; reinsurers 
underwrite the second (US$15 million) and third layers (US$25 million); the top layer (US$70 million) is 
financed with reinsurance (US$50 million) plus US$20 million coverage through a catastrophe swap 
between the World Bank (IBRD) and CCRIF. IBRD hedged its risk through a companion cat swap with 
Munich Re.  The US$20 million swap between IBRD and CCRIF is the first transaction to enable emerging 
countries to use a derivative transaction to access the capital market to insure against natural disasters. It is 
also the first time a diversified pool of emerging market countries’ catastrophe risk is placed in the capital 
markets. 
•  The Facility develops a financial strategy for surviving 1-in-1000-year events.  Should the total insured 
losses exceed its claims-paying capacity, payouts will be prorated based on the total amount of expected 
claims compared to the remaining available funds.  The CCRIF will then seek donors’ contributions and/or 
private capital for its recapitalization. 
•  The CCRIF is established as an independent legal entity.  It will be created as an Insurance Captive 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) owned by a trust.  Both entities will be registered in the Cayman Islands, a 
market leader in Insurance Captives.  The CCRIF will be managed by a Captive Manager under the 
supervision of a Board of Directors composed of representatives from the donors and client.  This Board 
will be supported by the technical advice of a specialized Facility Supervisor.  The Bank will not sit on the 
Board, but will retain control in the initial phase through a financing agreement with the Facility defining 
how donor funds can be used.   
•  The Facility could serve as a pilot program to be extended or replicated to other small states (such as the 
Pacific Island states).  Extending the pool to small states beyond the Caribbean that face similar natural 
hazards would provide further opportunities for risk diversification, thus lowering the cost of insurance.  
This extension would require the development of sophisticated probabilistic risk models for the regions 
involved (Pacific and Indian Ocean). 
Source: Ghesquiere and Mahul (2007). 
 
The Facility allow CARICOM governments to purchase coverage akin to business interruption insurance 
that would provide them with an immediate cash payment after the occurrence of a major earthquake or 
the passing of a hurricane.  Because of the speed at which a claim payment will be processed, the 
instrument will be particularly useful to finance the immediate post-disaster recovery, giving the affected 
government time to mobilize additional resources for longer-term reconstruction activities.  This 
insurance instrument does not intend to cover all losses faced by the governments, but just to address the 
liquidity crisis governments may face in the aftermath of a disaster. 
 
Government deficit losses due to natural hazards are estimated using state-of-the-art catastrophic risk 
modeling techniques.  They include: damage of government buildings; reduction of annual tax revenue 
due to loss of commercial facilities, business interruption, loss of import taxes and tourism taxes, damage 
of infrastructure and government relief expenditures.  Each of these loss components are estimated first 
and then combined to find the overall deficit loss for a country. 
 
Loss due to damage to government buildings.  These are direct damage to government buildings. 
 
Reduction of annual tax revenue due to loss of commercial facilities, business interruption, loss of import 
taxes and tourism taxes.  The reduction of tax revenue is estimated from the damage degree of 
commercial buildings in the country using a piecewise-linear relationship of annual tax reduction with the 
damage ratio of commercial buildings.  Tax revenue values are the total national tax revenue less the 
property tax. 
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Loss due to damage to infrastructure (bridges, roads, pipelines, hospitals…).  The damage to 
infrastructure is estimated based on the total damage to the residential buildings in the same area.  From 
the damage information in the past hurricanes in the Caribbean countries (see ECLAC reports), the loss 
amount from the damage to infrastructure ranges from 15% to 129% of the residential buildings (Grenada 
15%, Cayman islands 29%, Jamaica 62%, and Bahamas 129%).  Assumptions were made on the ratio of 
infrastructure loss to residential building loss by hazard and by country. 
 
Government relief expenditures.  Government relief expenditures after natural disasters are assumed to be 
1% of the total damage to the residential buildings in the same area by referring the information from 
ECLAC reports. 
 
Government deficit “loss exceedance curves” are built for every Caribbean country and parametric 
indices are developed for both hurricanes and earthquakes to fit the estimated government deficit loss 
curve.   
 
It is estimated that short term resources represent up to 20% of the government deficit loss.  Therefore, a 
cost-effective risk financing strategy should be designed to secure funds to be immediately available to 
cover these losses in the aftermath of a disaster 
 
Catastrophe insurance offered by the CCRIF aims at financing hurricanes and earthquake events with a 
return period between 25 years and 150 years.  Each participating country purchased coverage between 
US$4 million and US$50 million for hurricane risk, and between US$2 million and US$50 million for 
earthquake risk, with an aggregate coverage not to exceed US$50 million.  CCRIF insurance is shown to 
be cost-effective for this layer of risk, compared to self-retention: the CCRIF premium is shown to be on 





The Arrow-Lind Public Investment Theorem is usually presented as the rationale for countries to apply 
the policy of risk neutrality in the evaluation of public investment.  This paper has discussed how the net 
present value of a project should be evaluated under uncertainty: it depends on the discount rate, which is 
independent of the risky project under consideration, and the risk-adjusted expected social net benefit.  
This benefit is equal to the expected cash flow of the project if and only if the project risk is independent 
with the macroeconomic risk, leading to the Arrow-Lind theorem. 
 
This assumption of risk neutrality has been challenged when countries are exposed to natural disasters 
using an alternative model which captures the correlation among individual losses (caused by natural 
disasters) and the liquidity constraint the government faces.  We have shown that countries should 
evaluate the cost of natural disasters on the basis of a value higher than the expected loss, i.e., the social 
cost of catastrophic risk bearing is positive, if the catastrophic losses affect a large fraction of the 
population, the government faces liquidity constraints in the aftermath of a disaster, and the marginal 
opportunity cost of holding reserves is positive.  These conditions are met by most of developing 
countries exposed to natural disasters, and particularly small state islands.  This offers a rationale for the 
use of ex ante risk financing instruments, including insurance. 
 
                                                 
4 The country still needs to build individual reserves to cover losses caused by events with return periods of  25 
years or less.  The optimal risk financing strategy is not discussed here. See Gurenko and Mahul (2003) and Mahul 
and Gurenko (2006) for a conceptual discussion.   21
However, the indiscriminate use of financial instruments may lead to inefficient use of risk capital to the 
policy maker.  This paper has proposed a dynamic approach to design risk financing strategies that take 
into account the timing in mobilization of resources post disaster.  This approach relies first on the use of 
ex-post resources readily available and reduces the use of ex-ante instruments to mainly fund short-term 
liquidity gaps. 
 
By ensuring that sufficient liquidity exists very soon after a disaster, modern funding approaches can help 
to speed recovery, ensure that scarce government funds are well used and reduce the risk of moral hazard. 
In addition, catastrophe risk management can assist countries in the optimal allocation of risk in the 
economy, which may result in higher growth, better mitigation, and more effective poverty alleviation. 
 
These concepts are being used under the Caribbean catastrophe risk insurance initiative, which aims at 
providing Caribbean governments with insurance coverage to finance immediate post-disaster recovery 
needs.  This financial instrument is shown to be less expensive than self-retention to finance the 
catastrophic risk layer.   22
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Annex 1:  Using Catastrophe Risk Models to Assess Potential Financial Needs  
 
Probabilistic risk modeling is a common tool used by insurers faced with the challenge of assessing risks.  
In recent years, a growing number of analyses have tried to adapt such models to estimate the impact of 
potential natural disasters on the government budget.  These models generally build on the usual hazard, 
exposure, vulnerability and damage module of standard insurance package which are then used to derive 
the potential magnitude of relief and recovery costs, impact on government revenue and cost to assets 
which are the responsibility of the government.   
 
The financial impact of natural disasters on government budget is different from the impact on the 
portfolio of insurance business risk modeling firms are used to assess.  It thus requires an innovative risk 
assessment model using a different risk management paradigm than the one applied for the insurance 
industry.  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that latest catastrophe modeling techniques 
have been used to address the impact of natural disasters on the government budget. 
 
Hazard module: The hazard module defines the frequency and severity of a peril, at a specific location. 
This is done by analyzing the historical event frequencies and reviewing scientific studies performed on 
the severity and frequencies in the region of interest. Once the hazard parameters for each peril are 
established, stochastic event sets are generated which define the frequency and severity of thousands of 
stochastic cyclone or flooding events. This module can analyze the intensity at a location once an event in 
the stochastic set has occurred. This module models the attenuation/degradation of the event from its 
location to the site under consideration and evaluates the propensity of local site conditions to either 
amplify or reduce the impact.  
 
Exposure module: The exposure values of “assets at risk” are estimated either from available secondary 
data sources or are derived from the distribution of population. This “proxy” approach is used when the 
preferred specific site by site data is not available. Based on these data, the module then computes the 
value for all types of exposures as a product of multiplication of the area of total building inventory and 
the average replacement cost per unit of inventory.  
 
Vulnerability module: The module quantifies the damage caused to each asset class by the intensity of a 
given event at a site. The development of asset classification is based on a combination of construction 
material, construction type (say, wall & roof combination), building usage, number of stories and age. 
Estimation of damage is measured in terms of a mean damage ratio (MDR). The MDR is defined as the 
ratio of the repair cost divided by replacement cost of the structure. The curve that relates the MDR to the 
earthquake intensity is called a vulnerability function. Each asset class and building type will have 
different vulnerability curves for each peril. 
 
Damage module: To calculate losses, the damage ratio derived in the Vulnerability module is translated 
into dollar loss by multiplying the damage ratio by the value at risk.  This is done for each asset class at 
each location.  Losses are then aggregated as required.  Government assets or assets that are likely to be 
financed with government resources can be easily isolated and an assessment of financial needs for 
reconstruction calculated.  Based on the likely timing for reconstruction, these costs can be ventilated 
between short, medium and long term financial needs. 
 
Relief and recovery costs module:  Based on the estimated damage to buildings and infrastructure, it is 
generally possible to apply metrics of occupancy rate and derive assessments of the likely number of 
people injured, killed or left homeless.  This information can then be used to assess the likely cost of 
government relief and recovery operations. 
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Government revenue tax loss module:  Assessing the impact of disaster on government revenue is made 
particularly difficult because of the variety of effect a disaster can have on a national economy.  While 
most local businesses are likely to experience losses the increase in economic activity related to 
reconstruction operation may lead to an increase in economic activity both in the affected region and in 
the country as a whole.  An analysis of assets likely to be impacted by a disaster can give indications at to 
the potential sectors of society that will be most affected and the time it will take to recover.  This 
information combined with historical and economic analysis of past disaster can provide a good 
indication of the extent and timing of revenue losses for the government. 
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